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I. INTRODUCTION: ARGENTINA'S ECONOMY IN THE 1990s
In the early 1990s, Argentina was suffering from a 200%
monthly inflation rate with high tariffs and low productivity.' In
an effort to tame inflation and attract foreign investment, Argen-
tina stabilized its currency by pegging it to the U.S. Dollar.2 To
the extent the Dollar crept upward in the 1990s in relation to
other currencies, the Argentine Peso also began to appreciate and
imports became cheaper. The establishment of a currency board,
which pegged the Peso to the Dollar, succeeded in making imports
cheaper and curbing inflation.3 However, the appreciation of the
Peso placed exports at a comparative disadvantage.4 At least in
theory, domestic producers would have 'been forced to become
more competitive in order to compete with- inexpensive imports.
1. Economic Conditions, POLITICAL RISK SERVICES, Dec. 1, 1993, LEXIS, News
Group File [hereinafter Economic Conditions 931.
2. Robert Tracinski, Argentina's Intellectual Collapse: How IMF Policies Ruined
Argentina's Economy, CAPITALISM MAGAZINE, Jan. 7, 2002, available at http://www.
capitalismmagazine.com/2002/january/rwt _ argentina.htm.
3. Economic Conditions 93, supra note 1.
4. Paul Krugman, Argentina: Money Monomania, at http://www.wws.princeton.
edu/-pkrugman/mania.html.
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The currency regime attracted capital by providing foreign inves-
tors with confidence that contracts in foreign currency would be
honored even during economic slowdowns.' Borrowers were more
easily able to pay back loans from foreign creditors because they
were able to buy dollars with the equivalent quantity of pesos.
Although the currency board had success in bringing inflation
under control and increasing foreign investment, Argentina's
eight-year recession left the Peso substantially overvalued.' Dur-
ing this period Argentina's GDP either remained stagnant or
decreased because of a decline in exports due to protectionism in
major markets and an overvalued Peso pegged to the rising Dol-
lar. Further, the pegged rate gave Argentina less flexibility with
its monetary policy. This prevented Argentina from "monetizing"
its growing debt by printing money and paying in the form of
higher inflation.
During this period, significant deficits existed because of huge
pension systems, large grants to regional governments, corrup-
tion, and an inefficient, subsidized private sector." Increasing
imports and low exports created a critical balance of payment
problem For example, in 1997, exports accounted for less than 9
percent of GDP."°
By 1997, Argentina's foreign debt was over $100 billion dol-
lars." The economy, mired in a recession, began to unravel as
wave after wave of debt came due. Debt eventually became so
great that Argentina could no longer borrow except at very high
interest rates. Eventually, even multilateral lending institutions
such as the IMF refused further credit. A default became inevita-
ble, as Argentina could no longer borrow to service its existing
debt." When the crisis hit, Argentina closed banks and defaulted
on its debt. Restrictions on bank withdrawals, the drop in the cur-
rency value, and a ruined economy sparked riots and social
5. Tracinski, supra note 2.
6. Krugman, supra note 4.
7. Id.
8. Economic Conditions, POLITICAL RISK SERVICES, Dec. 1, 1996, LEXIS, News
Group File.
9. Economic Conditions, POLITICAL RISK SERVICES, Dec. 1, 1997, LEXIS, News
Group File.
10. Id.
11. Economic Conditions 93, supra note 1.
12. IMF to Blame for Argentina's Crisis, IPR STRATEGIC BUSINESS INFORMATION
DATABASE, Dec. 31, 2001, LEXIS, News Group File.
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unrest. 3
Missing from this brief summary is the relationship of IMF
policies to Argentina's crisis. Argentina had been borrowing for
almost a decade to support its currency board and budget deficit.
If the economy had emerged from recession during that period, the
IMF's Argentine program might have been deemed a success, and
the IMF would certainly have taken a large part of the credit.
Argentina's economy, however, remained stalled in recession.
Part of this comment's goal is to analyze whether the IMF's poli-
cies, or the so-called "Washington Consensus," may be partly to
blame for prolonging the recession, eventually leading to default
and economic collapse.
Criticism of IMF activity in Argentina can be divided into four
camps. Some critics believe the IMF was too strict in its lending
conditions to Argentina.14 Other critics hold that the IMF was too
lenient and let Argentina continually ignore the loan conditions."
Another view is that the crisis was self-inflicted through corrup-
tion and profligate spending. 6 Finally, a fourth view holds that
the IMF cut off funds just when Argentina was finally about to
turn around the economy. 7
These views over-simplify a complex situation and allow the
IMF to use the disparity of criticism as a shield, claiming it is
unjustifiably criticized whatever it does." In addition, the criti-
cism over the IMF's Argentina program is relatively muted in
comparison to the level of disapproval expressed by leading econo-
mists, such as Paul Krugman, Jeffrey Sachs, and Joseph Stiglitz,
regarding the IMF's actions in the 1998 Asian and Russian crises.
The goal of this comment is to examine the IMF's relationship
with Argentina over the course of a decade. The following ques-
tions will provide the framework for this comment: Did the IMF
help cause the crisis? What can the IMF do to make another crisis
less likely? What can the IMF do to make sure that if another
crisis occurs it will have less devastating effects? What are the
consequences of the policies the IMF puts into place and the condi-
tions it imposes? Has the IMF learned from its mistakes? Is there
13. IMF Team Reaches Argentina, Mass Protests Planned, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, May 30, 2000, LEXIS, News Group File.
14. Steven Pearlstein, For IMF, Argentina was an Unsolvable Puzzle,
WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 3, 2002.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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a demonstrable connection between IMF policies and economic
growth? Were IMF policies appropriate for Argentina?
It is the conclusion of this comment that the conditions
imposed by the IMF on Argentina did not address the causes of
the crisis, but, similar to its programs in past crisis countries,
served to encourage the nation to adopt the Washington Consen-
sus, even when it may have been inappropriate to do so. This con-
clusion is itself over-simplistic and will have to be qualified in
many respects. This comment will interweave the story of the
relationship between Argentina and the IMF with evidence dem-
onstrating the IMF's inappropriate action in Argentina.
II. THE IMF AND ARGENTINA
A. A Growing Crisis
As far back as 1991, Argentina began to follow the IMF
formula for economic stabilization and development, almost indis-
tinguishable from the so-called "Washington Consensus."19 This
advice typically consists of reducing budget and balance of pay-
ment deficits, raising interest rates, reducing inflation, privatiz-
ing state assets, and reducing trade barriers and regulation on
capital flows in and out of the country. Few criticized the IMF's
advice to Argentina in the early 1990s. Inflation was brought
under control and the IMF backed program helped combat fiscal
profligacy, which was Argentina's most serious economic problem
at that time.2" After years of inflation rising near 2000% per year
and a budget deficit at 23% of GDP, the decision to cut state
spending, reduce inflation, and privatize state industries seemed
the best advice.2'
By 1995, however, Argentina's economy was experiencing a
recession. The cash strapped nation had to obtain $11 billion in
financing, including $2.4 billion from the IMF, due to budget defi-
cits, a recession, and capital flight as the result of reaction to the
Mexican crisis.2 2 IMF decisions began to have a substantial influ-
ence on Argentina's economy, stock market, and foreign invest-
ment plan. In May of 1995, Argentina's government, fearing an
adverse market reaction, attempted to deny a report that it would
19. Argentina, BBC, Jul. 9, 1991, LEXIS, News Group File.
20. Economic Conditions 93, supra note 1.
21. Id.
22. Minister of Economy Announces Financing Package, BBC, Mar. 15, 1995,
LEXIS, News Group File.
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have to renegotiate IMF loan conditions.23 A few months later, the
government initiated renegotiations resulting in a huge fall in the
Argentine stock market." A recurrent pattern would develop over
the next six years, where the government would deny the gravity
of a situation only to capitulate and lose face shortly thereafter.
Although Argentina was entering a recession, the IMF's dog-
matic, fiscally oriented conditions remained the same as provided
in the early 1990s. It continued to insist on a fiscal surplus and
austerity measures, despite a growing recession. This resulted in
furthering an economic slowdown that depressed tax revenue,
making it impossible for Argentina to reach the IMF's fiscal
targets .2  However, because Argentina continued to liberalize its
economy through privatization, deregulation, and attempts at fis-
cal discipline, the IMF continued its support.26
In the 1990s, the IMF rarely varied its advice from nation to
nation, regardless of the specifics of each crisis. Why were IMF
conditions largely the same for Argentina, Mexico, Russia, and
Asia, unique economies with different types of crises? The IMF's
"success" in the Mexican crisis, which most observers agree was a
fiscal crisis, is one possible explanation for the IMF's one-size-fits-
all program.27 This may have led the IMF to treat Argentina in
1995 and the Asian crisis in 1998 in a similar manner. In essence,
the IMF's unwavering faith in its prescription kept it from cor-
rectly diagnosing the problem in Asia in 1998, which was a regula-
tory and banking crisis, not a fiscal crisis. 8 Similarly, the primary
problem with Argentina's economy in 1995 was the recession, not
fiscal profligacy.
The IMF's program of raising interest rates, cutting spending,
raising taxes and imposing other austerity measures had some
success in Mexico in 1994. The IMF began to apply the formula
across the board.2 9 The IMF's advice worsened the recession in
Asia that resulted from the crisis and created a panic as well.3 °
Asia essentially had a liquidity problem due to overextended and
23. Finance Secretary Denies Reports of Waiver, BBC, May 24, 1995, LEXIS, News
Group File.
24. Education, BBC, Aug. 29, 1995, LEXIS, News Group File.
25. Argentina: Country Update, Oct. 27, 1995, LEXIS, News Group File.
26. Id.
27. Frontline: The Crash: Interview with Paul Krugman, at http://www.pkarchive.
org/crises/crash.html [hereinafter Krugman]. Many doubt whether the Mexican
program was really a "success." See infra text accompanying note 35.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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improperly regulated banks, not a fiscal problem." Fiscal auster-
ity had worked in Mexico with its loose monetary policies and
huge public debts." After it failed in Thailand, the IMF kept
imposing the same advice on the rest of Asia as the crisis spread.
After the Asian crisis, the IMF should have learned something,
but it prescribed the same policies for Brazil. The IMF condi-
tioned loans to Brazil on raising interest rates, cutting the budget,
and suffering through the recession. 4
By the end of 1995, Argentina was so heavily dependent on
IMF loans and advice that not adhering to IMF polices threatened
to create an investor backlash." Regardless of the efficacy of the
31. Joseph Stiglitz, The Insider - What I Learned at the World Economic Crisis,
THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 17, 2000, http://pkarchive.org/others/stiglitz.html.
32. Krugman, supra note 27.
33. Stiglitz, supra note 31.
34. Krugman, supra note 27.
35. See Frontline: The Crash: Interview with Jeffrey D. Sachs, at http://www.pbs.
org/wgbh/pages/ frontline/shows/crashlinterview/sachs.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2002)
[hereinafter Frontline: The Crash]. The fact that by the mid-1990s investors viewed
IMF statements as important signals of Argentina's economic well being meant that
the IMF should have been extremely careful as to the remarks it made. The IMF has
been criticized for making announcements and taking drastic measures that caused a
panic in Asia, making the crisis worse than it otherwise would have been. At times,
the IMF also seemed heedless of creating a panic in Argentina. The IMF issued a
forecast for the economy that warned of a speculative attack if the government did not
institute further austerity measures. Similar types of statements helped create the
Asian crash.
When the IMF intervened in Mexico, instead of reassuring investors by providing
loans and assurance that problems were going to be corrected, the seriousness and
austerity of the measures triggered the large part of the panic. Mexico quickly paid
the IMF back, but money to accomplish this was simply borrowed from capital
markets, placing the debt burden on the Mexican people. Bulgaria, Mexico, and
Argentina in 1995, resembled Asia in that the IMF called for bank closures that
caused panic and capital flight.
When the IMF takes drastic actions, investors are prone to think something must
be critically wrong. After Thailand, the IMF intervened in such a dramatic way in
Indonesia and Korea by ordering banks to close that there was a general bank run
causing the banking system to implode and dragging the rest of the economy down
with it. Most economists insist the fundamentals in Asia were good. Intervening
with such dire announcements, when coupled with the typical conditions of high
interest rates, bank closures, and budget cuts, only enhances investor fear that the
economy is going into a contraction. The way the IMF goes about setting up a
program only aggravates the crisis by asking for a wholesale restructuring of the
economy-monetary, trade, and fiscal policy. This combined with social costs, such as
unemployment, overwhelmed the countries.
See also Paul Krugman, Will Asia Bounce Back? Speech for Credit Suisse First
Boston, Hong Kong (March 1998), at http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/suisse.html.
While Krugman agrees fiscal problems in Asia were not serious and an austerity plan
of the type the IMF imposed was not appropriate, he does not agree with Sach's panic
theory. Krugman explains that the IMF cannot act as a "no questions asked" lender
of last resort as Sachs would have it. First, the IMF, even when coupled with funds
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IMF's advice, the government could not ignore it without drawing
the attention of international markets, which had begun to view
the relationship between Argentina and the IMF as an indicator of
whether Argentina's economy was healthy. 6 Throughout 1996,
Argentina continued to follow the IMF's advice, but was unable to
meet most of the IMF's conditional fiscal and tax targets due to
recession.37
from the United States may not have enough money. Indonesia and Korea may have
quickly run through their credit line with any amount the IMF could actually afford.
Second, the crisis was not solely caused by a panic. A lender of last resort should lend
to illiquid banks, not insolvent ones, as was true of a number of Asian banks.
See also Jeffery Sachs, The IMF and the Asian Flu, 9 THE AMERICAN PROSPECT,
March 1 -April 1, 1998, available at http://www.prospect.org/print/V9/37/sachs-j.html
[hereinafter The IMF and the Asian Flu]. Panic can destroy an economy when a high
proportion of debt is short-term, so-called "hot money." In the 1990s, many nations,
on the advice of the IMF, opened up to international capital flows without a proper
regulatory environment, becoming susceptible to waves of euphoria or panic. If
foreign banks and other lenders loan large amounts of money to domestic banks short
term, which is then invested in long-term projects, the economy can be ruined by a
panic if banks decide to withdraw money out of the country. Because of pressure on
developing nations from the Unites States Treasury and the IMF to open markets too
quickly before adequate regulations were in place, short-term capital invested in
countries became volatile. "Hot money" fueled the Thai real estate boom that helped
cause the first Asian crash. The nations brought down in the Asian crisis had a total
short-term debt of $175 billion. As the flow of private capital increases due to
globalization, more crises will occur without regulation. Volatility in international
capital played a big role in the Great Depression as it does with recent global crises.
Argentina set limits on bank withdrawals and converted dollar debt to pesos as
the crisis unfolded to stem the hemorrhage of capital. Nevertheless, Argentina lost as
much as $25 billion in loans called in and taken off shore in the months preceding the
crisis. Argentina also lost a good deal to capital flight in 1994 and 1995. The IMF
could make it a condition for loans to have some regulations on the percentage of
capital that is short-term or even lobby for international regulations on capital
movement.
See also Paul Krugman, Start Taking Prozac, World Economy Laboratory
Columns Archive, May 1998, at http://www.imfsite.org/reform/krugman.html;
Interview by Lucy Komisar, Joseph Stiglitz: The Progressive Interview, 64 THE
PROGRESSIVE, June 1, 2000, 2000 WL 12369796. The world has moved from a
national to a global financial architecture without creating the corresponding global
version of national regulation. Insisting that countries open their markets to global
markets before adequate regulations are in place may create an economic disaster.
Some claim that all that is needed is greater transparency in developed countries.
However, investors had much of the key information needed to predict the crises. For
example, it was apparent to investors that the Korean firms had high debt to equity
ratios. Great Britain and Scandinavia, which probably have the highest level of
transparency in the world, have also had crises in recent times.
36. Five-Year Forecasts of International Economic Problems, POLITICAL RISK
SERVICES, Dec. 1, 1995, LEXIS, News Group File.
37. See IMF Approves 1.04 Billion Dollar Stand-by Loan to Argentina, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Apr. 13, 1996, LEXIS, News Group File; IMF Approves Waiver, New
Targets for Argentina, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 31, 1996, LEXIS, News Group
File.
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By the end of 1996, there were rising tensions between the
government and Argentine interest groups, which held that the
economic policy insisted on by the IMF was doing permanent dam-
age to the economy. 38 Austerity measures risked plunging Argen-
tina's economy, already hurt by the 1994 Mexican crisis and 1995
recession, deeper into recession. 9 Business leaders, economists,
and trade union leaders protested President Carlos Menem's
introduction of tax increases and spending reductions.41 Instead
of attempting to revive the economy and pay off foreign debt with
the higher resultant tax revenues and export income, Menem con-
tinued cutting the budget and raising taxes and interest rates.
Although growth would slow and unemployment increase, the
IMF insisted the austerity plan would help Argentina survive
coming amortization and interest payments, which would reach a
new high in 1997. 4I IMF loans continued to arrive to service the
$101 billion 1997 foreign debt.42
By 1998, domestic criticism of the IMF's extended role in
Argentina was overshadowed by the nation's dependence on IMF
credit to support the currency board, as well as its addiction to
borrowing from foreign lenders.43 Furthermore, the international
lending community itself believed the fate of the economy was
inexorably linked to its relationship with the IMF."
The fact that the beleaguered nation was entering its seventh
year of being unable to meet IMF conditions might have been a
signal to IMF officials. The IMF could have been accused of being
too lenient. The government seemed unable or unwilling to fully
comply with the IMF's conditions, yet loans continued to arrive.
Perhaps the IMF, like many banks, was simply unable to abandon
a failed project and preferred to keep throwing money at it in
expectation of an eventual turnaround. The budget deficit was $8
billion, or 60% over IMF aims.45 The government was, in a sense,
sitting between two chairs, austerity and stimulus, without gar-
38. Economic Conditions 93, supra note 1.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Arthur MacEwan, Economic Debacle in Argentina: The IMF Strikes Again,
FOREIGN POLICY IN Focus, Jan. 2, 2002, available at http://www.fpif.org/commentary/
2002/0201argentina body.html.
44. More Belt Tightening Necessary in Argentina, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Mar.
15, 2001, LEXIS, News Group File.
45. IMF Official Paints "Disturbing" Picture for Argentine Economy, BBC, Apr. 14,
1998, LEXIS, News Group File [hereinafter IMF Official].
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nering the benefits of either. The economy continued to drift in
recession and the government supported its deficits and debt ser-
vicing with further international borrowing. The IMF may have
been able to use its loans and influence on the international mar-
kets to apply more pressure than it did on the Argentine govern-
ment. Alternatively, the IMF may have been wrong because its
programs were too austere to support Argentina socially and polit-
ically, especially in the midst of a recession.
B. The Currency Board
Argentina's trade deficit was growing largely due to an over-
valued Peso. A pegged currency has the disadvantage of placing
one nation at the mercy of another nation's monetary policy and
limits a government's ability to exercise expansionist monetary
policy during a recession. The Peso was creeping up in value
throughout the 1990s, on the back of the strengthening dollar,
which hurt exports by making them more expensive.46 On the
other hand, the cost of borrowing is less expensive because lenders
see Pesos as readily convertible. This may accelerate internal
development and hold inflation in check. Imports are cheaper,
which should force domestic industry to become more competitive
to match the increasing buying power and standard of living
accessible to consumers through the consumption of imported
products.
It may have been better to devalue earlier and gradually, and
therefore less painfully. Argentina's case could be compared to
that of Russia, which benefited enormously from devaluation.47
Only after devaluation did the Russian economy improve because
of increased exports. Nevertheless, the IMF repeatedly warned
Russia against devaluation up until the crash occurred.48 Many in
the Russian government wanted devaluation, but the IMF con-
vinced them otherwise. 49 Renowned economist Paul Krugman
believes that, for Argentina, devaluation and a conversion of Dol-
lar debts into Pesos was necessary long before the 2001-2002 cri-
sis. Argentina only prolonged its agony.5" The currency board had
been instituted to provide stability, but was not an end in itself.
The overvaluation was depressing the economy, leading to a
46. MacEwan, supra note 43.
47. Frontline: The Crash, supra note 35.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Paul Krugman, Crying with Argentina, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2002, at A21.
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1
higher real interest rate and depressed exports.51 In 1998, how-
ever, the IMF insisted the currency board had "served Argentina
well, and continues to be an adequate framework for stable
growth."52 As late as 2001, the IMF continued to praise the dollar
peg.53
Argentina's fiscal picture was not hopeless. Its budget deficit
ranged from 1 to 3% of GDP, and its government debt was only
half of GDP.54 This is better than many European countries.55
The real problem in Argentina was not fiscal but economic. The
peg, designed to protect against inflation, "precludes any actions
that countries design to take to fight deflation, such as cutting
interest rates or letting the currency depreciate." 6 Krugman
notes:
Argentina has gone through wave after wave of fiscal aus-
terity, each time with the promise that the latest round of
wage or job cuts would restore confidence and produce eco-
nomic recovery. However, austerity did not bring recovery.
On the contrary, it worsened the recession, increased social
tension and further reduced confidence.57
Since spring 2000, economists at the IMF and in the United
States have been urging Argentina to preserve its peg and default
on its debt instead.55 The IMF seems to provide the same fiscal
advice to everyone regardless of the type of crisis. Advanced coun-
tries often devalue their currencies and never default on debt.
Yet, the IMF preferred some debt default to devaluation,59 even
though Argentina's debt was only half of GDP, which is not exces-
sive by modern standards. Default, however, would not let Argen-
tina cut interest rates, make goods more competitive, or end the
need for draconian fiscal austerity. Default would, in fact, do
nothing to end the crisis."
The IMF now claims it opposed the currency board despite
IMF statements throughout the 1990's that seem to prove the con-
51. Krugman, supra note 4.
52. IMF Concludes Article IV Consultation with Argentina, Mar. 11, 1999, http:ll
www.imf.orglexternal/np/sec/pn/1999/pn9921.htm.
53. IMF Praises Currency Peg, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Jan. 26, 2001, LEXIS,
News Group File.
54. Paul Krugman, A Cross of Dollars, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 7, 2001, at A23.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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trary.6 1 In addition, the IMF clearly supported overvalued curren-
cies in Russia and Brazil, although they led to tens of billions in
loans to fight off an inevitable devaluation. In retrospect, Russia
and Brazil seem much better off having devalued their currencies,
and the much-dreaded hyperinflation never materialized. Also,
maintaining a currency peg, even if the currency is slightly over-
valued as a result, would seem to be justified according to IMF
philosophy. After all, interest rates are raised to attract foreign
investors and much of the program is aimed at increasing investor
confidence. The currency peg initially increased investor confi-
dence by making it more likely that contracts in foreign currency
would be honored, even in an economic slowdown.
Many IMF policy decisions are made to promote stable
exchange rates.62 But these often wreak havoc, as in the case of
Argentina. If the exchange rate floats freely there is no need for
loans,53 and the balance of payments will be self-equilibrating.64
Increased interest rates, monetary contractions, and tax increases
are often imposed with the view of keeping the exchange rate sta-
ble.65 But it is questionable whether it is worth the effort. People
do not eat exchange rates, and, in the cases of Russia and Brazil,
countries are often much better off once the currency is allowed to
float. Much of the IMF's program would be unnecessary if a float-
ing exchange rate were adopted.
C. Issues of Social Equity
1998 also brought increasing criticism that the IMF was apa-
thetic to the costs of its programs on the public.66 Argentine elec-
tions and the growing need for social programs to offset the effects
of recession on the poor were beginning to clash with the IMF's old
and precise formula. That formula was: raise interest rates to
slow down domestic consumption and increase tax pressures to
shrink domestic demand, which in turn increases the proportion
of exports to imports and results in a balance of payments. The
IMF battled the government's attempts to institute labor reform,
61. Joseph Stiglitz, Lessons from Argentina's Debacle, STRAITS TIMES, Jan. 10,
2002, http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/bwi-wto/imf/2002/01 Ostiglitz.htm.
62. Lawrence McQuillian, The Case against the IMF, ESSAYS IN PUBLIC POLICY,
1998, at http://www-hoover.stanford.edu/publications/epp/98/98b.html.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. IMF Official, supra note 45.
67. Id.
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raise teachers' salaries, and improve deteriorating road condi-
tions. Concerns about rising unemployment were dismissed
when the Argentine Labor Minister went to Washington in search
of relief from pending IMF conditions, only to return having had to
accept IMF policies. 69 IMF programs are "voluntary," but as econ-
omist Jeffery Sachs notes,
[w] hen the United States informs a poor developing country
that it must agree with the IMF or else lose access to for-
eign aid, the goodwill of major governments, chances for
debt restructuring, and the confidence of the private mar-
kets, which are encouraged by the G-7 to use IMF agree-
ments as the focal points for their own bargaining, the
notion of voluntarism is a bit stretched."
Policies will not be sustainable in the long term if they do not deal
with issues of social equity.
Arguably, there must be something wrong with a system that
passes such high costs onto people that have not been speculating
on the international markets. In 1998, many saw the IMF's
bailouts as protecting wealthy investors, whose risky loans were
paid by the governments with IMF loan money, at the expense of
the poor, who ultimately bore the brunt of the austerity programs
installed to pay for those loans. 1 In Thailand, Indonesia, and
South Korea, health care, education, and environmental spending
were all drastically cut as part of the IMF austerity program.72
Unemployment and the poverty rate soared and remained long
after these nations were "officially out of the recession."73 The
social effects of IMF programs in Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea
are similar to those in Argentina. Most countries with IMF pro-
grams seem to experience similar deterioration, at least in the
short term. The few bright spots in the reduction of poverty have
been in China, India, and Botswana, nations that never had IMF
programs. It is essential that the IMF have governing boards
with greater representation among developing nations.74 At pre-
68. Id.
69. IMF Sets New Deadline for Modernizing Labor Laws, BBC, July 28, 1998,
LEXIS, News Group File.
70. The IMF and the Asian Flu, supra note 35.
71. Stiglitz, supra note 35.
72. Jacques-chai Chomthongdi, The IMF's Asian Legacy, Focus ON TRADE, Sept.
2000, http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/bwi-wto/imf/2000/asiafc.htm.
73. Id.
74. David Hage, Joseph Stiglitz- A Dangerous Man, A World Bank Insider that
Defected, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIBUNE, Oct. 11, 2000, available at http://www.common
dreams.org/views/101100-101.htm.
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sent, the United States dominates the IMF decision-making pro-
cess, with Japan and Europe also weighing in.75
If the IMF holds increasing investor confidence in the borrow-
ing country to be an important goal of its programs, how do riots,
unemployment, declining wages, and cuts in health and education
spending achieve this goal? The purpose of contractionary fiscal
policies is partly to build investor confidence. If these policies
involve killing social programs and cutting wages that lead to
riots and unemployment, what sort of confidence is built? Imag-
ine a potential investor sitting down to his morning coffee and
reading about riots in Indonesia and mass strikes by government
workers. Will he rush out to invest? The IMF could easily predict
a reaction of social unrest if the country is already deep in a reces-
sion. Often, as a result of "market based pricing," riots and social
unrest occur. Social unrest was easily foreseeable whether it was
the Indonesian riots after the IMF program eliminated food and
fuel subsides for the poor, the 2000 Bolivian riots over water
prices, unrest in Ecuador caused by the rise in cooking gas prices
at the bequest of the World Bank,76 or the Argentine riots in reac-
tion to bank withdrawal limits, cuts in government salaries, new
taxes and the expected currency collapse. In fact, the IMF actu-
ally predicts these riots.77 For example, in 2000, reports from the
Country Assistance Strategy for Ecuador stated that the IMF
expects its program to spark "social unrest."
78
D. Moral Hazard
Many investors believed the Peso would remain stable
because an IMF bailout would occur if necessary. For this reason,
investors may have been more likely to enter into contracts than
they otherwise would have been. In a contract where a foreign
creditor doubts the ability of the borrower to repay in hard cur-
rency, moral hazard is created when the creditor realizes that
IMF loans will support the Peso and allow it to maintain an artifi-
cially high value. The creditor will assume the borrower can con-
vert his pesos to dollars and make the loan when he otherwise
would not. The balance of risk versus payoff does not determine
75. Id.
76. Gregory Palast, The IMFs Four Steps to Damnation, THE OBSERVER, Apr. 29,
2001, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/bwi-wto/imf/2001/Pala0429.
htm.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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whether the loan should be made, but the confidence that the IMF
will come to the rescue regardless does. Moral hazard occurs
when the IMF's promise of a subsidized bailout reduces the cost of
fiscal irresponsibility.
The risk of moral hazard connected to IMF loans may have
increased with the 1994 Mexican bailout. The IMF bailed out
Mexico so it could pay off foreign banks that were making risky
loans with interest rates as high as 20% per annum. The banks
were not required to bear the risk they had assumed. A sharing of
the losses by banks and the governments may have been a better
option now that we realize that the Mexican bailout contributed to
the Asian crisis." Once banks saw that the IMF would bail them
out, they began to make risky investments in Asia.80 Interna-
tional banks now felt they had a safety net.81 Although the Mexi-
can government quickly repaid the loans, they did so by borrowing
from capital markets at higher interest rates.
In the midst of a recession in the mid 1990s, the Russian gov-
ernment had gone on a borrowing spree fueled by short-term
bonds, called GKOs, with enormous interest rates.8 2 Moral hazard
permitted Russia to finance huge unbalanced budgets with inter-
est rates as high as 100%."3 Encouraged by the Mexican bailout,
foreign lenders felt Russia was even more important than Mexico
and so would be bailed out in any case.84 Interest rates continued
to rise and the government kept paying foreign investors, which
were making unprecedented returns on their capital." The IMF
supplied the money to pay off the investors. Eventually there was
a crash and the Russian people were saddled with enormous debt,
while, as in Asia, investors escaped unharmed.86
While creditors in Asia did not receive explicit guarantees
from the government, press reports do suggest that those who pro-
79. Allan Meltzer, What's wrong with the IMF, THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW, V. IV,
n.2, Fall 1999, 201-215, available at http://www.imfsite.org/reform/meltzer.html.
80. Id.; See also McQuillian, supra note 62. Foreign bank debt accounted for 58 of
the 76 billion in capital inflow to Asia the year after the 1995 bailout. Many
economists believe this was partly due to the bailout in Mexico. By 1997, foreign bank
debt was 25% of the GDP of South Korea, 35% of the GDP of Indonesia and 45% of the
GDP of Thailand. It is important to remember that the IMF bailed out foreign
institutions that made bad loans to these countries; it did not bail out the citizens of
these countries who will have to pay for the bailout.
81. Meltzer, supra note 79 at 207.
82. Sachs, supra note 35.
83. Meltzer, supra note 79, at 209.
84. Id.
85. Sachs, supra note 35.
86. Frontline: The Crash, supra note 35.
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vided funds to Thai finance companies and South Korean banks,
many of which were foreign lenders, believed they would be pro-
tected from risky.8 This impression was reinforced by the political
connections of the owners of such institutions.8 Depositors in all
Thai finance companies were protected.89 Bank debt in Korea was
largely nationalized, the IMF gradually paid back, and the popu-
lace bore the burden in the form of higher taxes and spending cuts
in education, health, and other government programs.90 In 1994,
the IMF bailout of investors in Mexico "effectively privatized
investor profits and socialized investor losses."91 "By removing the
risk of default, the IMF encouraged riskier global investment that
fueled the East Asia crisis that erupted two years later."92
Asian governments were stuck with debt while foreign credi-
tors making risky investments went unscathed.93 After the Asian
crisis, George Soros remarked that the IMF responded by saving
many economies from default, but in the process, it effectively
"bailed out foreign investors who had speculated in their unsus-
tainable growth. ''94 In the end, the people were left to absorb the
costs. Changes in IMF policies have forced investors to share
more of the risk but this has only resulted in higher lending
costs .9
By removing the risk of default, the IMF encouraged riskier
global investments.98 When a bailout occurred in Mexico and Asia,
and again in Russia and Brazil, was it not reasonable for foreign
investors in Argentina to expect a bailout as well? Argentina was
capable of borrowing more and more, at higher and higher interest
rates, fueled by less risk, because of an expected bailout.
There is no evidence that moral hazard operated on the same
level in Argentina as in Asia and Russia, partly because Argen-
tina is not a nuclear or economic power. There was always some
doubt as to how big a bailout would occur. Ultimately, during the
87. Paul Krugman, What happened to Asia?, January 1998, http://web.mit.edu/
krugman/www/DISINTER.html.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. McQuillian, supra note 62.
92. Id.
93. Frontline: The Crash, supra note 35.
94. Michael Lelyveld, Soros, Sachs Criticize IMF's Policies, RADIO FREE EUROPE,
Nov 17, 2000, available at http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2000/11/ 17112000140
141.asp.
95. Id.
96. McQuillian, supra note 62.
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recent crisis, the IMF cut Argentina off and refused to offer loans
equivalent to those provided to Asia and Russia. Argentina's IMF
loans currently total 21.7 billion.97 In July 1998, Russia received
22 billion from the IMF in just one installment. 8 Still, moral haz-
ard may have played some part in the crisis. For example, moral
hazard may not only influence investors, but government officials
as well.9 It is sufficient for the existence of subsidized loans from
the IMF to modify a finance minister's evaluations of the costs he
faces. 0 Lending may delay reform by permitting governments to
continue inappropriate practices. 10 1 In Argentina, the possibility
of a bailout may have caused Finance Minister Cavallo to keep the
currency peg longer than he should have because he could use
IMF loans to defend it. After all, the peg was essential to control-
ling inflation and maintaining the Argentine standard of living.
Furthermore, although new rules are imposing higher interest
rates on borrowers, IMF rates are well below market rates. 102 For
example, Korea borrowed from the IMF in 1998 at 4.5% at the
same time it was issuing bonds at 14.5%.103
Foreign policy introduces further elements of moral hazard.
Many investors in 1998 admitted to planning to put on large Bra-
zilian or Russian positions because they felt that the IMF would
come in with a bailout for political reasons. 104 In 1998 and 1999,
the IMF, under pressure from the U.S. Treasury, expressed strong
support for Argentine bonds. 15 In part, this was because Argen-
tina was a staunch supporter of the United States and poster child
for the Washington Consensus.0 6
E. Protests and Further Decline
In 1999, although the IMF was preparing to increase its level
of aid to the nation, Argentina failed to meet IMF targets prima-
97. IMF Offers Argentina 8 Billion Dollars, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Aug. 22,
2001, LEXIS, News Group File.
98. John Laughland, The IMF Deserves no Credit, http://www.bhhrg.org/press-
articles/pressl998/imf-eur.htm (last visited November 26, 2002).
99. Meltzer, supra note 79, at 209.
100. Id. at 212.
101. Id.
102. McQuillian, supra note 62.
103. Id.
104. Charles Calomiris, When will Economics Guide IMF and World Bank
Reforms?, Vol. 20, No. 1, CATO JOURNAL 85, 89 (Spring/Summer 2000).
105. Id.
106. Id.
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rily due to recession.117 The ineluctable cycle of missed targets
and further loans fueled criticism of the IMF's policies. Fiscal def-
icit overshot targets by $3 billion in the context of minimal GDP
growth.'
In 2000, the IMF approved a $7.4 billion stand-by loan in
exchange for a commitment to keep the 2000 budget deficit below
$4.7 billion and demanded Argentina phase out its fiscal deficit by
2003.109 Street protests against IMF visits began and would con-
tinue intermittently until the current crisis. In order to obtain
IMF loan aid to service the now $115 billion debt, President Fer-
nando de la Rua announced an austerity plan approved by the
IMF that included steep tax hikes and cuts in social spending. 110
A large range of groups and institutions, including the Roman
Catholic Church, held the IMF largely responsible for the nation's
continued economic malaise."' With one-third of the population
living below the poverty line and 14% unemployment, mounting
social unrest led to one death and several injuries during the anti-
IMF riots."2
In October, almost exactly a year before the beginning of
Argentina's economic meltdown, the IMF had praise for Argen-
tina's economy, which was in "good economic condition to resume
sustainable growth.""' The praise was understandable, as the
government had agreed to follow the IMF formula at any cost. In
November, the government met with provincial governors to reach
spending cut agreements prior to IMF agreement to send a team
to discuss further lending arrangements. While Wall Street was
pleased, government workers joined the poor in erecting road-
blocks to protest the still rising unemployment rate and potential
further IMF austerity measures."' By the end of 2000, the IMF
was contemplating another fresh loan package worth $15
107. See Argentina to Negotiate Physical Debt Margin with IMF, BBC, Mar. 23,
1999, LEXIS, News Group File; Argentina Asks IMF to Raise Deficit Targets, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, May 18, 1999, LEXIS, News Group File.
108. Argentina likely not to Meet IMF Targets, BBC, Mar. 3, 1999, LEXIS, News
Group File.
109. Agreement with IMF Announced, BBC, Feb. 5, 2000, LEXIS, News Group File.
110. IMF Team Reaches Argentina, Mass Protests Planned, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, May 30, 2000, LEXIS, News Group File.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. IMF says Argentine Growth Weaker than Expected, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
Oct. 3, 2000, LEXIS, News Group File.
114. IMF Delays Argentina Trip Amid Row Between Federal Government and
Provinces, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 17, 2000, LEXIS, News Group File.
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billion.1 '
F. IMF Policy and the 2000-2001 Recession
To achieve the IMF program of reducing budget and balance
of payment deficits, reducing inflation, privatizing state assets,
increasing investor confidence, and reducing trade barriers and
regulation on capital flows in and out of the country, the IMF
imposes conditions on borrowing governments that frequently
involve raising taxes and interest rates and cutting government
bureaucracy and social spending, which may lead to higher unem-
ployment rates or reduced government salaries. A recession, how-
ever, may call for tax cuts, government spending to stimulate the
economy, cuts in interest rates, and deficit spending. Why should
Argentina pursue an austerity program when no developing
nation would embark on such a program during a recession?
Adherence to the Washington Consensus means IMF pro-
grams may be imposed on borrowing nations in a manner that
ignores the particular social, political, and economic circum-
stances prevailing at that time. Too often, the IMF seems to
employ a double standard when issuing advice to developing coun-
tries.'16 For example, imagine the United States, in the midst of a
recession, insisting on tight fiscal and monetary policy such as
balancing the budget, raising interest rates, increasing taxes,
reducing inflation, and slowing the economy.1"' The United States
in past recessions has cut taxes, lowered interest rates, and gone
into deficit spending to stimulate the economy.
The IMF conditioned money in 2000-2001 in the midst of a
recession on a zero-deficit policy.118 The United States itself does
not put emphasis on balancing a budget in a recession. In fact,
Argentina has run modest budget deficits, much smaller than our
own deficits during past recessions.119 Developing countries, how-
115. World Bank Approves $303 Million Loan for Argentine Province, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 22, 2000, LEXIS, News Group File.
116. Komisar, supra note 35.
117. Id.
118. IMF, Argentina Negotiations Enter Sixth Day, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Aug.
15, 2001, LEXIS, News Group File.
119. Mark Weisbrot, Argentina's Crisis, IMF Fingerprints, WASHINGTON POST, Dec.
25, 2001, at A33; See also Arthur MacEwan, Economic Debacle in Argentina: The IMF
Strikes Again, FOREIGN POLICY IN Focus, Jan. 2, 2002, http://www.fpif.org/
commentary/2002/0201argentinabody.html. Often investors see the budget cuts
themselves as a sign of the country's worsening crisis. It does not restore investor
confidence. In July, after the IMF prescribed budget cuts Argentina could only sell
bonds at 14% as opposed to 9% in mid-June.
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ever, are often told that they cannot implement the type of pro-
grams developed countries do when they face similar
circumstances. 120 Are developing countries too incompetent to
stray from any policy but the most conservative? The IMF seems
to want developing nations to live in a Pre-Keynesian world, while
the United States, Europe, and Japan enjoy the fruits of Keyne-
sian knowledge. The United States has declined to introduce a
balanced budget amendment into its Constitution because it
would "eliminate the ability to use fiscal policy as an anti-cyclical
device in a recession."121 In Argentina, the IMF seems to have
ignored the danger of imposing austerity packages on a country in
the midst of a prolonged recession. Would expansionist policies
not have been more appropriate? If there was ever a time for the
IMF to break from its ideology, the 2000-2001 recession may have
provided a window of opportunity to react to the specific needs of
Argentina's economy instead of following its formula, which in the
midst of a recession was threatening to strike the final blow to the
economy.
Perhaps the IMF's lack of country specific teams limits their
ability to do this. The IMF's record in Argentina indicates that it
did not waver, at least publicly, in ten years of prescribed auster-
ity, which, with some exceptions, was never really achieved. The
global slowdown in 2000-2001 following the 1998 crises created an
emergency economic situation in Argentina that may have called
for an economic stimulus instead of contraction. Nobel economic
laureate Joseph Stiglitz noted, "fiscal austerity was supposed to
restore confidence, but any economist would have predicted that
contractionary policies would incite slow-down, and that budget
targets would not be met." 22 Argentina was already deep in debt,
however, so the developed country analogy may not be entirely
appropriate. Still, the recession may have been a higher priority
than the Argentine debt, which was only 50% of GDP. Austerity
may have been the final kiss of death for Argentina.
With the Argentine population already suffering a deep reces-
sion, the austerity package led to social chaos by requiring further
cuts in social spending. First, this chaos further undermined
investor confidence. Second, growing opposition to pursuing aus-
terity over expansionist policy led to difficult negotiations between
120. Id.
121. Komisar, supra note 35.
122. Stiglitz, supra note 61.
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Argentina and the IMF.123 These further undermined market con-
fidence. Third, the market's obsession with the IMF made it
impossible for Argentina to stray from the advice, despite its resis-
tance. Finally, the IMF's program further slowed the economy
and made it more difficult to service debt, further undermining
confidence. The IMF's habit of applying the Washington Consen-
sus blinded it to the particular needs of Argentina and may have
ignored a window of opportunity to turn around the economy.
Finally, Argentina's troubles with the IMF developed in the
midst of a worldwide economic slowdown. The IMF could have
been more strict with its conditions on Argentina because there
was a higher demand for its loans. So, instead of relaxing condi-
tions for a country that is in a recession and needs to spend its
way out, the IMF tightens the belt. As several authors have
noted:
IMF conditionality varies procyclically: It is stricter when
the world is in a recession than when it is in a boom. The
period from 1979 to 1982 is a particularly good example.
There is econometric evidence that tightening of condition-
ality reduces the volume of IMF credits. One need not be a
Keynesian to criticize the procyclical effect of such varia-
tions in conditionality .... At a time of worldwide reces-
sion, when the demand for IMF credits increases, fund
officials can maximize their authority by tightening lending
conditions .... In boom times, in the other hand, the
decline in demand for credits leads to eased conditions ....
Varying conditionality thus becomes a substitute for alter-
ing interest rates since the rates the IMF can charge are
fixed in advance.'24
G. Pleasing the Markets
In January 2001, the IMF added an additional $14 billion
credit to the $7.4 approved in 2000.125 The IMF praised Argen-
tina's currency peg and expressed optimism about the economy. 26
Many leading economists called for devaluation, yet the IMF con-
123. IMF, Argentina Negotiations Enter Sixth Day, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Aug.
15, 2001, LEXIS, News Group File.
124. PERPETUATING POVERTY: THE WORLD BANK, THE IMF, AND THE DEVELOPING
WORLD, 53 (Doug Bandow & Ian Vasquez eds., 1994).
125. IMF Approves 14 Billion Dollars, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Jan. 12, 2001,
LEXIS, News Group File.
126. IMF Praises Argentina's Currency Peg, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Jan. 26, 2001,
LEXIS, News Group File.
174
2002] IMF POLICY AND THE ARGENTINE CRISIS 175
tinued to support the currency board.127 By this time it may have
no longer mattered whether the IMF's advice was good, as inter-
national markets had fixated on whether Argentina could fulfill
its conditions.2 8 The government had to take into account what
the markets thought the nation should do, not necessarily
whether market opinion reflected the right advice economically.
In turn, the IMF is pressured to construct programs that cater to
market myths. According to Krugman, in Brazil, the IMF was
confronted with problem of whether to tailor policies to what the
market thought was the right thing to do or what the Fund
believed was the correct economic advice. 129
This poses a dilemma for advocates of free trade. In the short
run, lowering tariffs will destroy jobs. A government may not be
able to devalue to support competitive exports for fear of specula-
tors, and cannot use fiscal or monetary policy to inflate the econ-
omy by printing money because it will cause capital flight.
Market opinion may make it impossible to follow free market
strategies because devaluation would lead to capital flight. It is
difficult to tell a country that protectionism just redistributes jobs
when, in that instance, it increases output and employment. 3
0 Of
course, the loss of jobs resulting from lowered tariffs or quotas
only occurs once, whereas protectionism exacts a toll on society for
as long as it policies remain in place.
In May of 2001, the IMF agreed to a $1.26 billion disburse-
ment to calm markets despite the fact that Argentina had missed
fiscal targets by a wide margin. 3' In August, a $40 billion crisis
package and a $30 billion debt swap had failed to convince inves-
tors the nation would not default on its $130 billion debt.'32 As
bank withdrawals from deposits reached $300 million a day,
police clashed with protesters. The government announced a 13%
reduction of all public employees salaries.'33 On August 13, news
sources began to report that the IMF and U.S. Treasury Secretary
127. Id.
128. More Belt Tightening Necessary in Argentina, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Mar.
15, 2001, LEXIS, News Group File.
129. Krugman, supra note 27.
130. Paul Krugman, Is the Economic Crisis a Crisis for Economics?, 1998, http://
www.pkarchive.org/crises/trouble.html.
131. Argentina Reaches New Agreement with IMF, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, May 4,
2001, LEXIS, News Group File.
132. Stocks Close Higher as Argentine Mission Heads to U.S. for IMF Talks,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Aug. 13, 2001, LEXIS, News Group File.
133. Argentine Markets Anxiously Await Word from Washington, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Aug. 13, 2001, LEXIS, News Group File.
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O'Neill no longer believed additional funding was appropriate
because a bail out would no longer work.'
H. The IMF Gives Up on Argentina
In August, negotiations dragged on for a $15 billion aid pack-
age that demanded further austerity measures to be implemented
despite mass protests and an economy in a deep recession. 3 ' By
late August, talks on extra funding had stalled. By this time, it
was clear that the IMF and the United States did not assign sys-
temic risk to the crisis.' In a widely publicized remark, United
States Secretary of the Treasury Paul O'Neill insulted the Argen-
tine people by seeming to equate their nation's importance to
Uganda's. 137 Alan Greenspan, in an appearance before Congress,
referred to the Argentine crisis as domestic in nature. 138 IMF offi-
cials did not want to commit the mistake of providing money that
would only be eaten by the markets in days or weeks. Any bailout
would have to be massive or do little good.'39 Strangely, the IMF
opted for the middle path, offering $8 billion of $15 billion sought,
bringing total IMF loans to $21.7 billion. 40
By November 2001, investors were concerned of a devaluation
or default as the government sought new loans from the IMF and
other institutions. 141 Further access to IMF loans was blocked in
December because the IMF refused to agree with the govern-
ment's new program. 2 Finally, in December, the IMF wanted
Argentina to devalue the Peso. 4 3 The currency had made Argen-
tine companies uncompetitive as imports flooded in from Brazil,
whose currency had devalued 21% in 200 1.144 The government
134. Argentine Delegation Set to Begin Fourth Day of Talks with IMF, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Aug. 13, 2001, LEXIS, News Group File.
135. Argentine Officials say Talks with IMF made Progress, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Aug. 16, 2001, LEXIS, News Group File.
136. Argentina, IMF Talks on Extra Funding Bogged Down, BBC, Aug. 19, 2001,
LEXIS, News Group File.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. IMF Offers Argentina 8 Billion Dollars, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Aug. 22,
2001, LEXIS, News Group File.
141. From Poster Child to Basket Case, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Dec. 2001, LEXIS, News
Group File.
142. IMF to Blame for Argentina's Crisis, IPR STRATEGIC BusiNESS INFORMATION
DATABASE, Dec. 31, 2001, LEXIS, News Group File.
143. John Lyons, Argentina Bonds Fall on Report IMF wants to Devalue Peso,
BLOOMBERG, Nov. 27, 2001, http://quote.bloomberg.com.
144. Id.
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placed restrictions on bank withdrawals to no more than $1000 a
month and began to default on its debt.'45 Throughout December,
the government continued to plead to the IMF for additional
loans. The government announced it would cut certain tax
breaks, which were once part of a stimulus package for corpora-
tions aimed at pulling the economy out of a recession. 4 6 Neverthe-
less, the IMF announced the economy would shrink for the fourth
straight year. 14
7
On December 18, the IMF's chief economist stated that
Argentina's "fiscal policy, debt and exchange rate regime is not
sustainable," that it would be the "subject of ongoing negotia-
tions," and "the answer to the problem lies in Argentina, the solu-
tion is up to Argentina but the IMF stands ready to help."4 '
Given that the IMF had largely authored Argentina's fiscal and
economic program for the past ten years, does the IMF itself not
share much of the blame? On December 21, 2001, the IMF
defended itself, stating, "[T]he economic program of Argentina
was designed by the government of Argentina and the objective of
eliminating the budget deficit was approved by the Congress of
Argentina."'49 In order to unblock the critical disbursement of
$1.264 billion, the government had to agree to further austerity
measures for the riot-racked nation.' 50
Distancing itself from the Argentine program, and denying
that instability resulted from the IMF's refusal to release addi-
tional funding, an IMF spokesperson stated that the government
was not going to be able to keep its pledge to eliminate its budget
deficit under the current program and that Argentina was "work-
ing through the difficult option that a sovereign nation has to look
at to put itself on sound financial footing," the initiative for which
must come from "inside the leadership of the country" and which
is not something "that can be imposed from the outside." 5' This
demonstrates a pattern of the IMF attempting to distance itself
from its failed policies. The IMF can always claim that the bor-
145. Thomas Catan, IMF Denies Loan to Argentina, FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec. 5, 2001,
http://news.ft.com.
146. Id.
147. IMF Warns of Further Slide in Argentina, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Dec. 18,
2001, LEXIS, News Group File.
148. Argentina Economic Policy "Not Sustainable":IMF, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
Dec. 18, 2001, LEXIS, News Group File.
149. MacEwan, supra note 43.
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151. Emily Schwartz, IMF Signals No Fresh Argentina Aid, Awaits New Team,
BLOOMBERG, Dec. 20, 2001, http://quote.bloomberg.com.
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1
rowing country did not implement its program well enough, yet
the repeated failure and inability of countries to implement the
programs may question the truth of the claim. From 1991 to 1999,
President Carlos Menem had followed Washington's injunctions
in almost every detail, by dismantling the public sector, dis-
missing hundreds of thousands of civil servants, liberalizing the
economy and foreign trade, privatizing industry, raising interest
rates, and allowing 90% of its banks and 40% of its industry to end
up in the hands of international capital.'52
III. THE "WASHINGTON CONSENSUS" AND
DEVELOPING ECONOMIES
There are a number of parallels between IMF activity in Rus-
sia and Argentina. The IMF stood by in both countries while bil-
lions from IMF authored privatization programs disappeared
through corruption and debt service. This should have been fore-
seeable, and once underway, the IMF did nothing to stop it, even
with full knowledge of its occurrence. 153 Both nations attempted to
transform a closed, state-run economy, but inadequate constraints
were adopted to curtail corruption.154 Traditional distrust of the
state led to disrespect for the rule of law, resulting in corruption
and tax evasion. 15 5 President Duhalde, in an effort to push
through his freeze on bank deposits, clashed with and ignored
Supreme Court rulings, 56 recalling Yeltsin's order to shell Parlia-
ment and disband Russia's Constitutional Court. On December 1,
2001, Finance Minister Cavallo set a $250 limit on withdrawals
from bank accounts; yet $15 billion had already been taken out of
the country in the previous month by international speculators. 57
The Argentine people ultimately bore the brunt of the new cur-
rency limits, while the wealthy shuttled funds off shore. In a dec-
ade as the IMF's neo-liberal show state, unemployment rose from
3% to 20%, the number of people in poverty climbed from 200,000
152. Carlos Gabetta, Argentina: IMF Show State Revolts, LE MONDE
DIPLOMATIQUE, Jan. 12, 2002, http://www.en.monde-diplomatique.fr/2002/01/12
argentina.
153. Frontline: The Crash, supra note 35. The IMF had knowledge that funds were
being used improperly in Russia.
154. Sachs, supra note 35.
155. Id.
156. Argentina's Supreme Court Calls Banking Freeze Unconstitutional,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 2, 2002, http://www.detnews.com/2002/business/0202/02/
business-405944.htm.
157. Sachs, supra note 35.
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to 5 million, and illiteracy grew from 5% to 32% as education and
government budgets were slashed.'58 Such impressive numbers
are only surpassed by Russia, which in the time of its relationship
with the IMF saw its real per capita gross national product drop
by almost 40 percent, a turn of fortunes unprecedented in world
history during peacetime.5 9
One possibility is to have country specialized teams or pro-
grams designed by the borrowing governments themselves. Previ-
ous country-tailored programs designed by member governments
justifiably take into account the complex set of circumstances in
each country. 6 ° "The most novel and successful stabilization pro-
grams of the past ten years, whether in Bolivia, Estonia, Israel,
Mexico or Poland, are those that were designed by country teams,
often over the IMF's initial objections." 161
What is particularly disturbing is that what studies have
been done show no correlation between IMF programs and eco-
nomic growth.162 IMF staff economist Moshin Khan found that the
programs had a non-significant effect on balance of payments and
inflation, a positive effect on current account balances, and a sig-
nificant negative effect on output.'63 In other words, the programs
moved the current account toward balance by reducing output,
income, and imports.'6 A study by the Heritage Foundation found
that in terms of per capita wealth, of the eighty-nine loan recipi-
ents from 1965 to 1995, 54% were no better off compared to the
time they received the first IMF installment. 16 5 Of these coun-
tries, 35% were poorer, of which almost half had economies which
had been reduced by 15%.166 Moreover, if investor confidence were
the key for a recovering economy, it would seem that limiting cor-
ruption would also be important to the IMF. Yet, the IMF, no less
in Argentina than in Russia, Korea, and Indonesia looked the
other way as even the money it loaned was used for corrupt pur-
poses. 167 The countries with the best globalization records, such as
China, India, and Botswana, never had IMF programs. Further-
158. Id.
159. McQuillian, supra note 62.
160. The IMF and the Asian Flu, supra note 35.
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more, the only empirical study on the relation of capital market
liberalization as defined by the IMF and economic growth has
found no correlation.
168
IV. TRANSPARENCY AND DEMOCRACY
IMF programs are difficult to judge objectively because of the
lack of transparency in the decision-making process. IMF offi-
cials, as reported in a Washington Post article, claimed to believe
all along that the currency regime was the wrong monetary
approach for Argentina. 169 Although on previous occasions the
IMF had announced that it supported the peg. The lack of trans-
parency and secrecy in the organization makes it impossible to
objectively evaluate IMF performance. It should not be so difficult
to determine whether the IMF's support of a currency regime may
have been a critical factor in the economy's collapse. IMF head,
Horst Koehler, recently admitted that the IMF did not pay enough
attention to the drifting of Argentina's economic policies in the
late 1990s, and shared "the failure with the whole international
community." 7 ° Such vague admissions are hardly helpful in
understanding exactly what occurred within the Argentine
program.
Leading economists have demanded published reports,
audits, and opinions be published.' 7 ' Prolonged studies and con-
sultation with outside experts are not always possible in a rapidly
developing crisis.'72 Nevertheless, preserving better records of the
internal process will serve to stimulate healthy criticism after the
mission is completed. The executive board should not automati-
cally approve the proposals submitted by staff. It must consult
outside experts and make operations public so that objective criti-
cism and review can take place. The IMF does not disclose its
agreements with borrowers, although the country is free to do
SO.173
Although Washington preaches democracy, the IMF conducts
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itself like a dictator. Those most affected by the IMF's policies
have little influence on the conditions imposed. In Korea, the IMF
insisted that all Presidential candidates endorse an agreement
they did not draft, negotiate, or understand.7 4 Stiglitz criticizes
the IMF because it imposes its conditions without time for consen-
sus building and public debate. When a crisis explodes there may
not be time for such measures but in a slowly building crisis, such
as that experienced in Argentina, and arguably Russia, the IMF
should have worked out a compromise with the Argentine govern-
ment. The facts presented tell only a partial compromise with the
Argentine government and much of the old habit of imposing con-
ditions. Furthermore, the IMF frequently uses teams that have
little or no experience with the country. The IMF does not have
enough outside consultants and objective criticism of their
decisions.
The United States is not moving gracefully into the multi-
polar future. One problem with changing IMF policy is that the
IMF does not necessarily agree with the values inherent in the
arguments of this comment. As Charles Calomiris has recognized,
To some, the IMF should be a vehicle for leveraging U.S.
foreign policy. From this point of view, IMF limits on flexi-
bility, independent evaluation of performance, and trans-
parency are undesirable. For example, the U.S.
government told Pakistan that IMF lending was condi-
tioned on signing a nuclear nonproliferation treaty. This
undermines the economic effectiveness of the fund, having
to serve ad hoc foreign policy goals over the greater concern
of promoting stable economic development around the
world. It forces the IMF to depart from procedures, thus
undermining its integrity. 175
V. CONCLUSION
While no one organization can be blamed for Argentina's col-
lapse, and no single measure could have prevented such a complex
event, certain lessons can be gleaned from a study of the relation-
ship between Argentina and the IMF. The Fund pressures
nations to get their fiscal house in order to attract investor capital.
However, if budget cuts lead to the decimation of social programs,
which are all the more necessary during a crisis, fiscal control may
lead to results contrary to its purpose, the stabilization of the
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economy. Riots and social instability do not attract investment,
but fuel capital flight.
Fighting devaluation by maintaining a rigid currency regime
may slow inflation and make governments popular, but may in
the long run undermine an economy. Adopting a floating
exchange rate could often make borrowing from the IMF
unnecessary.
Insufficient financial regulation, combined with moral haz-
ard, leads to irresponsibility in the private sector. The poor are
left to pay for IMF bailouts that often simply serve to enable
wealthy investors to shuttle capital out of the country. The IMF
could expand conditionality to extending the social safety net,
such as requiring borrowing nations to hold a certain amount of
unemployment insurance.
Tight restrictions on capital flows can hinder investment and
lead to capital flight. On the other hand, capital market liberali-
zation for countries in the early stages of developing a market
economy is very risky. The IMF advises largely unrestricted
access to imports and foreign investment. Yet, the world economic
success stories argue otherwise. Britain, the United States,
Japan, Western Europe, Taiwan, and South Korea all built foun-
dations for development on government regulation of trade, bank-
ing, and investment. 7 ' This line of criticism has been somewhat
effective, as the IMF is now recognizing the need for greater regu-
lation in the banking and financial sectors in developing nations.
Some regulation of foreign investment is necessary because
the social risk is often greater than the private risk. The investor
imposes greater risk on society than is borne by him alone. Risky
investors must share the risk in actuality, not just in theory. A
tax could be placed on certain transactions to increase the cost of
"round tripping." Foreign investors often make high interest
short-term loans and then pull the money out of the country when
the term expires. When this is done on a large scale due to some
real or perceived economic emergency, the resulting capital flight
can destabilize the economy. A tax on every short-term loan could
be used to create a social fund to be utilized in the event of a crisis.
Further, IMF loans could be conditioned on minimizing the per-
centage of foreign debt held short-term. In addition, freezing capi-
tal outflows provides time to assess burden sharing, and the
creation of an international bankruptcy court could serve to this
176. MacEwan, supra note 43.
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end. Finally, the United States may require, as a duty of United
States corporate citizenship, that companies of substantial wealth
invest long-term in developing economies that have made every
effort to attract investment. For example, Bulgaria, in the eyes of
the IMF, World Bank, and the U.S. Treasury, has for years been
doing everything right to create an investor-friendly environment.
Yet, for some reason capital still stays away. These market econ-
omy wallflowers must be brought into the dance, or capitalism
may eventually be discredited.
Economic policy is perhaps the most important way in which
the United States interacts with the world. Yet, "the culture of
international economic policy in the world's most powerful democ-
racy is not democratic."'77 Part of the tragedy is that the United
States does not practice what it preaches. American protection-
ism can be partly blamed for the Argentine crisis. The United
States promulgated the "open your markets" mantra while keep-
ing its own closed. Argentina could greatly benefit from free trade
with the United States because it would have a comparative
advantage in food products, such as beef, and textiles, such as
leather. However, American protectionism in these areas erases
this potential advantage. Why did the United States not consider
lowering some of these tariffs to help Argentina's economy when
the country entered a recession and fell further into debt?
The double standards are obvious to all. The United States
itself does not practice tight fiscal policy when it is in a recession,
yet it has repeatedly advised others to do so. Pursuing the stan-
dard IMF formula during a recession, of implementing fiscal mea-
sures and austerity programs that often cause the economy to
contract, may dramatically worsen the economic situation. More-
over, after the savings and loans debacle and the regulation that
followed, the United States preached the gospel of market deregu-
lation around the world.
Developing nations should work as a bloc to negotiate agree-
ments and preconditions with the IMF. The threat of repudiation
could be an effective bargaining tool. Latin America may better
serve its interests not by joining a Free Trade Area of the Ameri-
cas (FTAA), but by strengthening and enlarging MERCOSUR to
create a customs union. Further, it is essential for IMF boards to
have greater representation and input from developing nations.
177. Komisar, supra note 35.
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VI. UPDATE ON THE ARGENTINE CRISIS
Nine months after the $141 billion default and collapse of the
Argentine economy, the nation remained mired in a depression
and unable to convince the IMF to provide new loans. As of Sep-
tember 2002, unemployment stood at 21.5%, 53% of Argentines
have fallen below the poverty line, and the economy has lost more
than 20% of its GDP since the last business cycle peak in 1998.178
The continuation of Argentina's economic collapse occurs amidst a
backdrop of reports that U.S. policy is fueling populism in South
America.
[U.S. policy] largely consists of a drug war aimed at peas-
ant coca growers, regular but empty promises of trade
expansion and a constant flow of international aid that
chiefly serves to prop up corrupt officials and defend the
status quo. The Washington Consensus applauded the sale
of state utility companies across South America to private
monopolies, even though that once again left the region's
poor at the pricing mercy of the traditional elite.179
Opposition is building in- South America to the decades-old
free-market experiment as demonstrated by the recent victories of
leftist politicians like Luiz da Silva in Brazil and ex-colonel Lucio
Gutierrez in Ecuador's presidential run-off.18 0 The market reforms
ushered in after the global collapse of communism are facing
increasing resistance due to the upheavals in the region and may
threaten the prospects for a FTAA.
While Argentina has recently convinced the IMF to postpone
loan repayments of $1 billion and $2 billion, and negotiated a $500
million debt swap between the Inter-American Development Bank
and the World Bank, the nation has yet to procure new loans from
the IMF or convince the IMF it has marshaled the political con-
sensus to undertake the necessary reforms."" Although Argentina
defaulted on its public debt, reneging on obligations to multilat-
eral lending institutions such as the IMF or World Bank would
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transform Argentina into a financial pariah.182 To further compli-
cate matters, the IMF may be especially cautious about lending
this time around as the last IMF loan of $8 billion in August 2001
is widely viewed as a mistake that only served to finance the same
capital flight for the wealthy, for which the IMF has long been
criticized. 18
Still, it remains doubtful whether the IMF could ultimately
have done anything to effect a different outcome. Helie de
Pourtales, a former head of the International Department of
Lazard Freres, notes,
The fundamental cause (of the crisis) is in the constitution,
written in 1853 when it took two months to go from North
to South by horseback. There are 24 parliaments, 24 minis-
ters of finance, 24 ministers of health - 24 of everything, if
you include the central government. The 23 provincial gov-
ernors are all powerful makers of Presidents and politi-
cians. They can borrow and spend all they like and then
shove the responsibility onto the federal authorities, which
cannot do much about it.184
It is typical that in the recent round of negotiations with the IMF,
this time over the plan to unfreeze bank deposits, the IMF is fre-
quently confused by varied and discordant messages emanating
from Argentina's government. 8 ' Further discord results from dif-
ferent branches of the government clashing over fundamental
aspects of the crisis program. Argentina's Supreme Court has
held unconstitutional the widely unpopular banking withdrawal
freeze.'86 On October 12, 2002, Congress shelved impeachment
proceedings against all nine justices of the Supreme Court, which
President Duhalde sought after his efforts to prevent depositors
from withdrawing money from their bank accounts were ruled
unconstitutional."i 7 Since then, the high court has constantly
thwarted Duhalde, reversing government increases in utility rates
and salary and pension cuts, and leading the IMF to complain
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that a lack of political consensus was impeding a new loan agree-
ment with Argentina.188 Moreover, fueled by the popular senti-
ment of bank bashing, Congress has recently blocked a plan to
turn frozen bank deposits into bonds.'89
These recent difficulties are typical of what the IMF has had
to face throughout its history with Argentina. If the Argentine
government cannot agree upon an economic program, how can the
IMF be expected to find an effective program for it? However, if
this is a valid defense for the IMF, it ultimately leads to questions
of whether the IMF should remain in the business of lending dur-
ing crisis situations.190 Further, any criticism of the IMF's actions
must consider whether different advice, even if the Argentine gov-
ernment had been persuaded to adopt it, would have had any ben-
eficial effect. For example, if the devaluation of the Peso had
occurred earlier, might the unpopularity of the action have led to
the same social unrest the IMF is often accused of causing?
To complicate an ultimate assessment of the IMF's advice,
Argentina's downward spiral may be coming to an end and the
economy may be on the verge of recovering as a result of the natu-
ral economic processes that come into play following devaluation.
This seems to be occurring despite the nation's inability to obtain
further IMF loans. There is a current account surplus as a result
of devaluation making exports more competitive and decreasing
the ability of Argentines to afford imports. 9' Therefore, the
nation is capable of paying for imports in the foreseeable future
without further borrowing.'92 Based on this analysis the economy
may be set to recover without new loans from the IMF. Argen-
tina's economy is beginning to resemble a replay of Russia's post-
crisis recovery. After years of fighting recession, debt payments,
and an overvalued currency, the 1998 crisis and devaluation
spurred the Russian economy into its current four years of unprec-
edented growth as imports decreased due to diminished buying
power, spurring domestic industry to rapid growth as a result of a
devalued Ruble.
Nevertheless, there is a growing agreement among econo-
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mists that given the political, social, and cultural complexity of
economic crises, the simplistic application of the Washington Con-
sensus, which acts as a procrustean bed in which inefficient, bro-
ken economies are "fixed," is no longer a viable approach. The
IMF's mission in the future will hopefully be to help solve eco-
nomic problems and not simply promulgate an approach based on
a rigid economic philosophy. There is a range of policies that must
be selected based on conditions in each country. Still, it is not
clear that much has been learned from the mistakes. Nine
months after Argentina's foreign debt default, IMF projects such
as Brazil, which is in peril of defaulting on its $250 billion debt,
Turkey, and Uruguay, are on the brink of crisis, giving rise to the
belief that little progress has been made to halt the string of serial
busts plaguing developing economies.193 The crisis in Argentina is
an example of what can occur when a dogmatic formula of
macroeconomic ideals descends into social reality. When the ideal
becomes grotesque and absurd by the time it reaches down to the
people it was intended to help, the substance of the ideal and the
process of its application must be reconsidered.
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